JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Only recently has this broadly conceived and methodologically inclusive approach been graced with a name: "international history." Here foreign policy is but one part of foreign relations, and may in any event be a cultural construct. Hence the importance to this school of "images," "perceptions," "belief system" and "cognitive maps."6 As important as 
The China Quarterly the study of the historiography of China's foreign relations seem unable to escape ancient political debates.14 In all this excitement comparatively few have given serious scholarly attention to China's diplomatic history. John Garver, Andrew Forbes, Donald Jordan, Odd Arne Westad, Youli Sun, Nicholas Clifford and others whose work is cited below have made vital contributions, but few among these would consider themselves diplomatic historians. It may be that international history has chased diplomatic history, that is, the study of the practice of diplomacy, almost entirely from that small patch of the China field that has continued to study foreign relations. 1912 inherited not what one might call "historical China" but the Da Qing Guo, the vast Qing empire, the multinational and multicultural expanse that included Manchuria, Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan and Tibet, among other areas. No Chinese empire had ever been so big for so long as the Qing realm of the Manchus. The first decade of the 20th century was full of portends of its dissolution. But the amazing fact of the Republican era is that this space was not only redefined, as "Chinese" and as the sacred soil of China, but also defended diplomatically to such a degree that the borders of the PRC today are essentially those of the Qing, minus only Outer Mongolia. The Qing fell but the empire remained. More accurately, the empire became the basis of the Chinese national state. This was perhaps the greatest accomplishment of Republican diplomacy.
Defending the boundaries. The task of defending the Republic's farflung and militarily indefensible borders fell mainly to a diplomacy that was hard-pressed, often creative and always obstinate. For example President Yuan Shikai announced in 1912 that he was "restoring" the titles of the Dalai Lama of Tibet -who had fled to India in 1910 -even as the Dalai Lama was declaring himself in full control of Tibetan territory. Two years later China refused to sign a convention with British and Tibetan authorities that would underscore China's "suzerainty," but not full sovereignty, over Tibet. In the 1920s and 1930s China played up the authority of the Panchen Lama, who had fled to China proper, in contrast to the stubbornly autonomous Dalai Lama. But when in 1940 a new Dalai Lama was named, the Nationalist regime once again acknowledged his claim to spiritual, if not temporal, authority, on the premise that the title was its to bless. When in 1942 Tibet opened its own Foreign Ministry, China, unlike Britain, refused to deal with it.19 As British influence -the main external support of Tibetan autonomy -disappeared in the post-war years, Tibet's formal reassociation with the Chinese state was but a matter of time. In short, a series of Republican governments refused to resolve the Tibetan question until it could be settled in China's favour, as it was in 1950.
A determined policy of non-recognition and an even greater degree of diplomatic patience was required to maintain the several regions of Xinjiang within China's potential pull if not its orbit. Here the cause was helped by the political dominance of the essentially self-appointed Han Chinese governors Yang Zengxin and Sheng Shicai, whose self-interest in suppressing ethnic separatism and, to the degree possible, setting limits to Soviet influence, served the long-term purpose of retaining the concept of Chinese suzerainty in a realm in which the Chinese state had almost no real power. Even when, in the late 1930s, Xinjiang became "a virtual territorial extension of the Soviet Union"20 at a time when China was The China Quarterly dependent upon Soviet military aid in the war against Japan, the Nationalist regime refused to abandon its claim. Instead, it bided its time until Soviet power was diverted and it could perform a "delicate surgical procedure"21 to install Nationalist Chinese leadership of the province in what John Garver has called a "brilliant" and well timed diplomacy that possibly "saved Xinjiang for the Chinese nation."22 It then dealt with the contemporaneous rebellion known as the "Eastern Turkestan Republic," which sought less separation from China than local autonomy, and ultimately would be granted neither. Missionaries of a more familiar sort have been the subject of study and controversy ever since Mark Twain's warning that "every convert runs a risk of catching our civilization" inaugurated a sceptical literature that competed with missionary-friendly accounts of "God's work in China." 84 Only recently, however, has scholarship begun to address the relationship between mission work and international political interests in this period."85 At the same time, the subject of religion, which curiously has seldom been at the heart of missionary studies, is being taken seriously. The work of Daniel Bays in particular is demonstrating how Christianity, too, could be "internalized" in 20th-century China and could find a place among "indigenous" Chinese religions. 86 Missionary work of a more secular kind is highlighted by recent works, including novels, revolving around the history of the YMCA in China. Paradoxically, when higher education was gradually brought back under the control of the Chinese state in the 1930s, this too was on the basis of -or was at least legitimized by -international advice in the form of a commission from the League of Nations' programme on International Intellectual Co-operation. This "Becker Commission," named for its leader, the former Prussian minister of education C. H. Becker, decried the disorganization of Chinese education (which for some reason it blamed on the Americans). It aimed to strengthen the state's hand in setting educational agendas; to rationalize geographically and fiscally the system of national (guoli) universities; and to establish a nation-wide system of entrance examinations that would permit authorities to channel admissions to specific disciplines. The result was to reorganize, centralize and ultimately to nationalize Chinese higher education96 on the basis of an "authoritarian view of knowledge"97 shared and, in time, implemented vigorously by the Nationalist regime. In terms of disciplines, the reforms that took place in the early 1930s marked a fundamental, and so far permanent, shift of priorities in Chinese higher education away from the humanities and social sciences, in which enrolment began to be limited, in favour of science, mathematics and engineering.
The greatest international schools of all were simply the treaty ports, the multi-cultural arenas of learning, meeting and nationalist conflict. These were the hubs of modem economic growth and the central meeting places between Chinese and foreigners (not to mention between Chinese of different regions) in the first part of the 20th century. They were the most conspicuous breeding grounds of new social classes with international connections. Their heyday co-incided with Chinese capitalism's first "golden age"; of China's first -and last -independent workers' movement; and of an internationally-oriented intelligentsia poorly connected to the state. Here are the best examples of the world of Republican China's "private" foreign relations. 98 In the field of Republican Chinese history Shanghai, at once an international and a Chinese city, has been a natural focus of new work. In the study of that metropolis alone Emily Honig and Elizabeth Perry have reopened the field of labour history, which had lay dormant in the West since the work of Jean Chesneaux; Frederic Wakeman has brought to light the dark, underworld struggles of the police and their adversaries;
The China Quarterly Emily Honig has investigated migrant culture, Jeffrey Wasserstrom student culture, Wen-hsin Yeh banking culture -all assisted by archival sources that were not open to research just a few years ago. 99 Yet the international social history of these cities remains to be written. The "sojourners" studied by Wakeman, Yeh and others consist of the Chinese bankers, industrialists, workers, students, journalists, gangsters and prostitutes who gradually came to think of themselves as "Shanghai people." It is not the Shanghai of international sojourners -businessmen, adventurers and refugees from around the globe -who are the protagonists in Nicholas Clifford's recent study. Nor is it the Shanghai of young John Hay Thornburn, the British permanent resident who murdered, and was murdered, in defence of the place that once was known as the Ulster of the East.100 These cities were sites not just to visit -the scope of international tourism being what it was in the days before transcontinental air travelbut places to live, work, and to be a home abroad for foreign nationals who made China their primary domicile. Above all it is the history of the interaction between Chinese and foreign sojourners in China that is the missing story of modem Sino-foreign relations. The opening of Chinese and international archives now permit this history now to be written, and, simply put, to "bring the 
